Center for Climate Risk Management

Abstract: Should social and political values influence how climate scientists choose among models, analyze data and reach conclusions? We might think not, but recently a number of philosophers have argued that such value influence can be entirely appropriate. I will suggest a reframing of this value influence, which makes it seem less radical.

Abstract: During the Covid-19 pandemic, public debates about the validity of scientific findings and the value of science have intensified, as some Americans have actively resisted and even denied the legitimacy of scientific guidance about how to address the disease. What are the social and psychological drivers of public skepticism about science? How can skeptics be convinced otherwise? How do we evaluate the role of facts, of political affinity, and of personal identity in the rejection of scientific advice? According to Naomi Oreskes, Henry Charles Lea Professor of the History of Science at Harvard University, most people who reject science won’t be persuaded with more technical facts. They deny scientific findings because they do not like the implications of their veracity—what Oreskes terms “implicatory denial.” However, addressing those perceived implications—and answering the concerns or fear involved—can help us to make progress. This holds true in a range of domains, from Covid-19 denial to climate change.

Abstract: Climate research, like many areas of policy-relevant science, invariably includes a wide variety of choices that can affect the results. Most scientists and policy makers argue that it is important to be open and transparent about these choices so decision makers can respond to them in an informed manner. This talk explores challenges associated with the effort to be transparent and provides suggestions for pursuing transparency in ways that are meaningful to a range of different stakeholders and community members.

Abstract: Prioritarianism is an ethical view that gives extra weight to the well-being of the worse-off. Like utilitarianism, prioritarianism is consequentialist (it evaluates choices in light of their possible outcomes) and welfarist (the goodness of outcomes is seen as reducible to facts about individuals’ well-being). Utilitarianism ranks outcomes according to the simple sum of well-being. Prioritarianism, by contrast, employs a concave transformation function for well-being—the effect of which is to accord priority to the worse-off. Prioritarianism is operationalized for governmental policy choice via a “social welfare function” (SWF). In this talk, I will discuss the SWF framework generally and prioritarianism specifically, and then discuss its application to risk regulation, Covid-19 policy, and climate change.

Abstract: Climate research, like many areas of policy-relevant science, invariably includes a wide variety of choices that can affect the results. Most scientists and policy makers argue that it is important to be open and transparent about these choices so decision makers can respond to them in an informed manner. This talk explores challenges associated with the effort to be transparent and provides suggestions for pursuing transparency in ways that are meaningful to a range of different stakeholders and community members.

Abstract: The need for scientists to consider the social values of those affected by scientific information might be proportional to the influence that information has in social decisions. However, a greater influence by scientists in social decisions might lead to an illegitimate influence on democratic institutions. This talk lays out an account of social values in science - particularly climate science - and explores tensions between this account and democracy.

Abstract: In this talk I suggest that the significance of two of the most important risks of climate change are misunderstood. Political risks matter because the very future of liberal societies and democratic governance are in jeopardy; existential risks matter because they feed political risks, and because they threaten the very sources of meaning in our lives. Together, existential and political risks contribute to and reflect our sense of powerlessness.

Abstract: Welfare weights which assign a greater weight to the welfare of the rich are commonly used in regionally disaggregated climate-economy models. This paper considers two modelling alternatives which give equal weight to the welfare of all people living at particular time in order to identify the climate policy path which maximizes global human welfare. Both alternatives call for more rapid emission reductions than the conventional approach, and if emission reductions in developing countries are financed by developed countries, the stringency of the welfare maximizing climate policy path increases further.

Abstract: Catastrophe insurance is a useful tool for managing the risks associated with natural hazards. This talk explains why pricing catastrophe is so difficult and proposes a way of dealing with it.